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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Labor Law-Arbitration-Courts Determination Whether
Grievance Is Within Agreement To Arbitrate
Several employees of a company left their jobs for a portion
of a day and the company dismissed them. The union alleged that
the dismissal was without "proper cause" and sought to have the
grievance submitted to arbitration under the arbitration clause in
the contract. The company contended that the union breached the
contract by violating the no-strike provision and therefore they did
not have to submit to arbitration. The district court granted the
order to arbitrate. Held, in affirming the lower court, although
there is an alleged violation of the contract by a union this does not
relieve a company from its responsibility to arbitrate the dismissal
of the employees. Whether the leaving was justified is a question
for an arbitrator and even if it were not, there is an additional
question for the arbitrator as to whether the discharge of these men
was proper under the contract. Molders Union v. Susquehanna
Casting Co., 283 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1960).
The decision in the instant case is a reflection of the impact
of two recent Supreme Court decisions, United Steelworkers v. Amer-
ican Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), and United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In these two cases,
the Suprem& Court indicated that federal courts should be extremely
reluctant to deny arbitration to a party seeking it under a collective
bargaining agreement. The court in the instant case in a very short
opinion followed the decisions of these two cases by refusing to
look to the merits of the case. The court stated that since there
was a provision in the contract for the arbitration of disputes, and
since a dispute had arisen, the case was proper for arbitration.
The decision in the instant case, which applies the doctrine
set forth in the American Manufacturing and Warrior decisions,
supra, is a product of the attempt to properly interpret a collective
bargaining agreement and provide an adequate remedy for an alleged
breach of contract. The basic problem was created by the fact
that at common law a contract to arbitrate was not specifically en-
forcable. With the decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), which interpreted section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952), the court
solved this problem. The Lincoln Mills decision authorized the
federal courts to specifically enforce executory agreements to arbitrate
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and to develop a federal substantive law applicable to collective
bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce.
After the Lincoln Mills decision the federal courts were con-
fronted with a barrage of cases concerning the arbitrability of a
particular labor dispute, again presenting the age-old problem of
the respective roles of the courts and arbitrators in labor dispute
cases. A.B.A., Labor Relations Law 161 (Sec. Proc. 1960). The
courts were confronted with determining whether the particular
alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement was one
which the parties had agreed to arbitrate. "To resolve the question
the court must make (a) an analysis of the nature of the controversy
and (b) an interpretation of the arbitration clause." Cox, Current
Problems in The Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 247, 258 (1958). To determine whether the parties had agreed
to arbitrate a particular dispute would seem to be an easy task, re-
quiring simply a reading of the agreement and then a decision
thereon. Although this seems to be a simple task, the courts had
great difficulty with it and the various courts had different standards
which they applied to arrive at their decisions. Some courts would
look to the merits of the case to make their determination as to
whether the alleged violation was arbitrable. This was the view
that was taken in the courts which followed the so called Cutler-
Hammer doctrine. Local 402, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-
Hammer Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947). Some
federal courts allied themselves with this doctrine by holding that
frivolous claims were not subject to arbitration. See Davenport v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1957); Local
205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st
Cir. 1956).
The Cutler-Hammer doctrine was rejected in the American
Manufacturing and Warrior decisions, supra. In the American Man-
ufacturing case, where there was an agreement in the collective
bargaining contract to submit all grievances to arbitration, the court
held: "The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not
merely those which the court will deem meritorious." American Mfg.
Co., supra at 536. The Court stated that even the processing of frivol-
ous claims might have therapeutic values. The Court in taking this po-
sition affirmed the philosophy expressed in Cox, Current Problems
in The Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKy MT. L. REv. 247,
261 (1958).
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The Warrior case presented a more difficult problem for the
consideration of the Court. The collective bargaining contract con-
tained an agreement to arbitrate differences as to the meaning and
application of provisions of the contract, but excluded from arbi-
tration matters which were strictly a function of management. The
employees protested when the company contracted-out work which
they had previously done. When the employer refused to arbitrate
this grievance the union brought suit to compel arbitration. The
Court held that the employer must submit this grievance to arbitra-
tion. The Warrior case seems to suggest that a court must find
that the parties have agreed to arbitrate every alleged breach of the
collective bargaining agreement unless, (1) an express provision
excludes the dispute from arbitration, or (2) in the absence of an
expressed provision of exclusion, the most forceful evidence of
such an intention is present. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., supra at 584. Doubts as to arbitrability of a grievance
should be resolved in favor of arbitration. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., supra at 583.
The full impact of the American Manufacturing and Warrior
decisions has not yet reached the courts, but in those cases which
have been before the courts the decisions in general seem to follow
a pattern similar to the instant case. See Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93 (3d
Cir. 1960); Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills, 188 F. Supp.
728 (M.D. N.C. 1960), in which the court refused to review the
merits of an arbitrators award relying on the American Manufactur-
ing and Warrior decisions. In Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers
v. General Electric Co., 283 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1960), the court,
following the American Manufacturing and Warrior decisions looked
to the contract and decided that the parties by express provision
had contracted not to arbitrate the disagreement in question. In
Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md.,
187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960), the court followed the decisions
in American Manufacturing and Warrior but seemed to do so with
some reluctance.
The theory or guide lines set down by the Supreme Court in
the American Manufacturing and Warrior decisions seem to have
been followed in the instant case. The collective bargaining agree-
ment called for the arbitration of any disputes which might arise
during the life of the contract. Thus when the court was presented
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with making a decision as to whether an alleged violation of the
contract should go to an arbitrator for his decision, it only looked
as far as the face of the contract, and decided that the parties
must submit to arbitration. The court did not consider whether the
claim was meritorious or frivolous, as it could have done before
if it had followed the Cutler-Hammer doctrine.
The self-restraint that the courts have placed on themselves
in the arbitration process by these decisions has wide and varied
ramifications. The collective bargaining agreement has been taken
from the courts and placed in the hands of an arbitrator for his
construction. The merits of this situation are of course subject
to many varied opinions. It has long been recognized that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is a hybrid type of contract, and it has
been argued that its construction should be left to a person who
is more familiar with the workings of industry and labor relations,
rather than to the average judge who has little time to familiarize
himself with these conditions. This is discussed in Cox, Reflections
on Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. Rv. 1482 (1959). Although
this self-restraint imposed by the courts seems to be new, it is only
new to the judicial process. For many years several large companies
have in effect contracted to stay out of court, by providing that all
alleged breaches of the contract will go to arbitration. What these
companies have done for years by specific provisions in their con-
tracts is in effect what the courts have done by their interpretation
of the arbitration clause in these cases. The only way the companies
or unions can now keep a particular grievance from going to arbi-
tration, if the spirit of these decisions is followed, is to specifically
provide this in the contract. This leads to a number of very im-
portant considerations as to what will be the impact of these de-
cisions in arriving at a workable collective bargaining agreement.
See Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration: An
Arbitrator's View, 63 W. VA. L. Rav. 295.
William Warren Upton
1961 ]
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 15
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol63/iss4/15
